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The aim of this paper is to analyze bank competition in Russia by measuring the market power of 
Russian banks and its determinants over the period 2001-2007 with the Lerner index. Earlier studies 
on bank competition have focused on developed countries whereas this paper contributes to the 
analysis of bank competition in emerging markets. We find that bank competition has only slightly 
improved during the period studied. The mean Lerner index for Russian banks is of the same mag-
nitude as those observed in developed countries, which suggests that the Russian banking industry 
is  not  plagued  by  weak  competition.  Furthermore,  we  find  no  greater  market  power  for  state-
controlled banks nor less market power for foreign-owned banks. We would consequently qualify 
the procompetitive role of foreign bank entry and privatization. Finally, our analysis of the determi-
nants of market power enables the identification of several factors that influence competition, in-
cluding market concentration and risk as well as the nonlinear influence of size. 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan pankkien välistä kilpailua Venäjällä. Kilpailua ja sen tekijöitä 
mitataan käyttäen Lernerin indeksin avulla laskettua markkinavoimaa (market power). Vastaavaa 
tutkimusta on aiemmin tehty vain kehittyneiden talouksien aineistoa käyttäen, joten tämä tutkimus 
antaa ainutlaatuisen mahdollisuuden vertailla kehittyvän talouden pankkisektorin kilpailutilannetta 
kehittyneiden maiden tilanteeseen. Tulokset osoittavat pankkien välisen kilpailun kiristyneen vain 
vähän vuosina 2001–2007. Lernerin indeksin arvot Venäjän aineistossa ovat keskimäärin saman-
suuruisia  kuin  aiemmissa,  kehittyneisiin  maihin  keskittyneissä  tutkimuksissa  löydetyt.  Valtion 
omistamien pankkien markkinavoima ei tulosten mukaan eroa yksityisten pankkien markkinavoi-
masta ja toisaalta ulkomaalaisomisteisten pankkien markkinavoima ei eroa kotimaisten pankkien 
markkinavoimasta. Ei siis ole itsestään selvää, että ulkomaisten pankkien tulo markkinoille olisi li-
sännyt  kilpailua  Venäjän  pankkimarkkinoilla.  Lisäksi  tutkimuksessa  osoitetaan,  että  alueellisten 
markkinoiden keskittyminen, pankkien riskinotto sekä pankin koko määrittävät Lernerin indeksillä 
mitattua pankkien välistä kilpailua. 
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1  Introduction  
 
In the wake of major structural changes in banking industries around the globe, the impact of bank 
competition on economic growth has generated increasing interest in the literature of recent years. 
Since banks play a key role in the financing of the economy, changes in bank competition are sup-
posed to exert an impact on access to bank finance in the form of lower loan rates or relaxing of fi-
nancing  constraints  (Cetorelli  and  Gambera,  2001;  Carbo-Valverde,  Rodriguez-Fernandez  and 
Udell, 2009). Such developments would suggest a positive impact of bank competition on economic 
growth (Claessens and Laeven, 2005). 
Bank competition is even more important for economic growth in emerging countries. 
First, these countries are characterized by low ratios of credit to GDP, which may be a result of the 
financing obstacles created by subdued banking competition. Second, bank lending is the leading 
source of external finance in these countries, owing notably to underdeveloped capital markets. In 
spite of this, earlier studies investigating the level and the determinants of bank competition focus 
instead on developed countries (e.g. Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez, 2005). 
Russia is a very interesting example of such an emerging market. Bank lending is stun-
ningly low, with a ratio of domestic credit to GDP of 25.7% in 2005, compared with a world aver-
age of 55.8% (EBRD, 2006). At the same time, bank lending represents the largest source of exter-
nal finance for companies
1. This picture has not changed despite impressive economic and banking-
sector growth in recent years, including a doubling of the ratio of banking sector assets to GDP. 
Our aim in this paper is to analyze bank competition in Russia in the recent years by meas-
uring the market power of Russian banks over the period 2001-2007. We utilize a rich panel dataset 
from the financial information agency Interfax and the Central Bank of Russia, which provides 
quarterly data for all Russian banks. In line with recent studies on bank competition (Fernandez de 
Guevara, Maudos and Perez, 2005; Solis and Maudos, 2008; Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; 
Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009), bank competition is measured by the Lerner index. This measure of 
market power directly infers a bank’s conduct and then informs on the actual behavior of the bank. 
First, we measure the level and the evolution of the market power of Russian banks during 
the period of study. We assess the level of market power of banks in Russia and compare it with 
                                                 
1 The 2009 OECD report on Russia also stresses the importance of bank lending by mentioning that “Russia has seen 
the rapid evolution of securities markets and other non-bank financial activity, especially in the past 8 years or so, but 
banking still accounts for almost all financial intermediation” (OECD, 2009, p.122) Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill 
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other countries. We also investigate whether strong economic growth influenced banking competi-
tion in recent years. 
Second, we investigate whether market power depends on ownership. Russian banking is 
characterized by the coexistence of three different types of banks: state-controlled banks, domestic 
private banks, foreign-owned banks. We analyze whether the privatization of state-controlled banks 
or relaxing of foreign bank entry contribute to reducing market power in the Russian banking indus-
try. 
Third, we analyze the determinants of market power for Russian banks. This is done to 
provide relevant insights for economic policy, by identifying factors which can be influenced so as 
to enhance bank competition. Furthermore, this analysis allows us to examine the extent to which 
these determinants are similar to those observed in other countries. Indeed, earlier studies on deter-
minants of banks’ market power have all looked at developed countries (Fernandez de Guevara, 
Maudos and Perez, 2005; Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos, 2007). Therefore, this identification 
of the determinants of banks’ market power is a significant contribution to the analysis of bank 
competition in emerging countries. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Russian banking in-




2   Russian banking sector, 1998-2008 
 
In stark contrast to the volatile 1990s and the financial and economic crisis of 1998, the last ten 
years have witnessed a Russian banking sector starting to resemble banking sectors in many other 
emerging economies. Russian banks by and large take in retail deposits, provide credits to both 
households and enterprises, engage in fairly standard operations in capital markets, and issue bonds; 
some even participate in international loan syndications.  
The Russian ruble has been freely convertible since July 2006, and there are no restrictions 
on the capital account. Payments do flow across Russia’s eleven time zones fairly reliably, several 
foreign banks have found their way into the top-10 banks, and even bank cards are in common use 
in the big cities. On the surface therefore, Russia’s banking sector looks like that of a typical emerg-
ing economy. Deeper investigation however reveals a number of structural features uncommon for 
other European emerging economies.   
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The main difference is that no major bank privatization has ever occurred in Russia on the 
scale that was seen in Central European countries. The state has retained control over some of the 
Soviet-era sectoral banks, notably the major savings bank Sberbank and foreign-trade banks VTB-
Vnestorgbank  and  VEB-Vnesekonbank.  The  large  state-controlled  banks  have  been  significant 
players in the market throughout the post-Soviet period.  
The corollary of this is that the private banks are mostly de novo banks, established in the 
early 1990s. Russia still has a very large number of private banks, most of them miniscule. Many of 
them are believed to be pocket-banks of an industrial group and to have little if any exposure to the 
interbank markets. There were more than 1300 banks operating in Russia in 2000. This number has 
decreased significantly over the last ten years even though the banking sector as a whole has grown 
substantially (see Table 1). 
Due to the sheer size of the country, Russia’s banking system entails wide regional varia-
tion. Roughly half of the banks are registered in the capital, Moscow City, and the other half are 
headquartered in the rest of Russia’s 86 regions. Only the larger banks have regional networks to 
speak of, and the majority of Russian banks do not conduct major operations outside their home re-
gions. Out of the 1100 banks operating in 2008, only less than 300 have branch offices in other re-
gions (CBR). Despite the impressive number of banks, there is wide regional variation in availabil-
ity of banking services. Some of the remote regions in Russia are being served only by the state sav-
ings bank, Sberbank, and a handful of tiny private banks. In regions with larger cities, however, 
market concentration can be very low. The robust growth in the banking industry over the last dec-
ade has however clearly widened the scope of banking services available also outside Moscow. 
Berkowitz and DeJong (2008) argue that the emergence of bank credit has indeed been an important 
engine for real income growth across Russian regions since 2000.  
The financial crisis in 1998 led to an increase in state’s share in the banking sector, due to 
some bank takeovers and to deposit flight to state-controlled banks, understood to have implicit 
state guarantees. The crisis, however, also initiated a number of financial sector reforms that par-
ticularly favored private banks. The single most important reform was the introduction of a deposit 
insurance scheme in 2004, which was hoped to level the playing field between state-controlled and 
private banks.
2 The state also, by 2004, withdrew its minority shareholdings in many medium and 
small-scale private banks. The plans to partly privatize the county’s top banks, Sberbank and VTB, 
                                                 
2 For the effects of the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme and other reform packages see e.g. OECD (2009) 
and Berglöf and Lehmann (2009). Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill 
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ended in large IPOs in 2007 that resulted in 40 % and 23% private shareholdings respectively in the 
two banks. No further privatization of the large state-owned banks is planned.  
The reforms have clearly improved the legal environment, but they have not reduced the 
share of state-controlled banks in the Russian banking industry. According to Vernikov (2009), the 
share of the five largest state-related banking groups (Sberbank, VTB Group, Gazprombank Group, 
Rosselkhozbank, and Bank Moskvy) in total banking sector assets increased from 35% in 2001 to 
49%  in  2009.  The  current  financial  crisis  has  further  increased  the  state’s  share  in  the  sector. 
Vernikov (2009) estimates the share of predominantly state-owned banks in total banking sector 
assets at 56% in July 2009.  
Foreign bank penetration in Russia has been modest, albeit on the increase. There are no 
binding legal barriers to foreign bank entry, but the low foreign bank penetration can be partly ex-
plained by memories of the 1998 crisis when many foreign investors incurred huge losses. More-
over, the legal and regulatory environment in Russia is only slowly beginning to resemble that of 
many other transition countries. Foreign-owned banks are however becoming increasingly impor-
tant. The number of banks with foreign ownership has increased from 174 in 2000 to 228 at the end 
of June 2009
3. In early 2008 two of the top-10 banks in Russia were foreign-owned. The share of 
foreign-owned banks in total assets of Russian banking sector reached 17 % in 2008.   
In contrast to other emerging economies with similar income levels, the level of financial 
intermediation by banks is very low in Russia. However, the growth of the banking sector has been 
impressive since 2001. Since then, bank credit flows to the private sector have increased by more 
than 20 percent of GDP, reaching 36% at the end of 2007 (CBR). The spectacular growth rates were 
a product of an improving macroeconomic environment, higher income levels, availability of cheap 
foreign funding and domestic institutional reforms. 
 
 
3  Methodology 
   
3.1   Lerner index 
 
Empirical research provides some tools for measuring bank competition. These can be broken down 
into the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) and new empirical IO approaches. The traditional 
IO approach proposes tests of market structure to assess bank competition based on the Structure 
                                                 
3 Of 228 banks with foreign ownership, there were 106 with majority foreign ownership (i.e. more than 50%).  
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Conduct Performance (SCP) model. The SCP hypothesis argues that greater concentration causes 
less competitive bank conduct and leads to higher bank profitability. According to this, competition 
can be measured by concentration indices such as market share of the largest banks or the Herfin-
dahl index. 
The new empirical IO approach provides non-structural tests to circumvent the problems 
connected to inferring competition from indirect proxies such as market structure or market shares 
under the traditional IO approach. In comparison, non-structural measures measure banks’ conduct 
directly using micro-level bank data. 
Following the new empirical IO approach, we measure bank competition by the Lerner in-
dex, which is based on individual bank-level data. The Lerner index has been widely used in recent 
studies on bank competition and market power (e.g. Solis and Maudos, 2008, Carbo-Valverde et al., 
2009). The Lerner index is defined as the difference between a bank's price and the marginal cost, 
divided by the price. The index values range from a maximum of 1 to a minimum of zero, with 
higher numbers indicating greater market power and hence less competition. The Lerner index in 
fact represents the extent to which a particular bank has market power to set its price above mar-
ginal cost. A zero value indicates perfect competition and no monopoly power.  
The price is computed by estimating the average price of bank production (proxied by total 
assets) as the ratio of total revenue to total assets, following Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and 
Perez (2005), Carbo-Valverde et al. (2009), and others. The marginal cost is estimated on the basis 
of a translog cost function with one output (total assets) and three input prices (price of labor, price 
of physical capital, and price of borrowed funds). Symmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions in 
input prices are imposed. The cost function is specified as 













2 1 0                 





j j w y w w w y y TC  
  where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w1 the price of labor (ratio of personnel ex-
penses to total assets)4, w2 the price of physical capital (ratio of other non-interest expenses to 
fixed assets), w3 the price of borrowed funds (ratio of interest paid to total funding). Total costs are 
the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses and interest paid. The indices for each 
bank and time have been dropped from the presentation for the sake of simplicity. The estimated 
coefficients of the cost function are then used to compute the marginal cost (MC): 
                                                 
4 As our database does not provide information on the number of employees, we use this proxy variable for the price of 
labor, following Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez (2007) and Karas, Schoors and Weill (2010) among others. Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill 
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Once marginal cost is estimated and the price of output computed we can calculate the 
Lerner index for each bank and obtain a direct measure of bank competition. 
 
 
4  Data and variables 
 
We use quarterly bank-level data from the financial information agency Interfax. Our sample is 
composed of observations from the first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2007. To ensure that a 
bank carries out lending activities, we keep only banks with more than 5% of loans in total assets. 
Our final sample consists of over 24,000 bank quarter observations, which are available for the es-
timations. The data on bank foreign ownership is from the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). We de-
fine a bank to be foreign-owned if the foreign ownership share in its assets exceeds 50%. State-
controlled  banks  are  defined  using  the  list  provided  in  Vernikov  (2007).  Information  on  bank 
branches by regions is collected from the CBR website. Regional data are from Rosstat and the in-
vestor risk rating from the Russian rating agency ExpertRA
5. 
In the estimations, we analyze the determinants of the market power of Russian banks. To 
do so, we perform regressions of the Lerner index measuring market power on a set of variables. 
The selection of variables is based on two former studies on the determinants of market power: Fer-
nandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez (2005) (hereafter FMP), Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos 
(2007) (hereafter FM). Both of these studies investigate the determinants of banks’ market power 
by computing Lerner indices, but they differ in their geographical scope. While FM (2007) focus on 
Spanish banks, FMP (2005) consider the five largest EU banking markets (France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, the UK). Previous studies point out four key determinants of market power: concentration, 
size, elasticity of demand, and risk. 
Herfindahl Index, as used to measure concentration, is defined as the Herfindahl index for 
assets computed at the regional level. Taking into account the size of Russian territory and great 
regional variability, the regional market is the relevant market for evaluating competition. We use 
distribution of branch offices as a proxy for banking output by region for calculating the Herfindahl 
index for a given region. The Herfindahl index for a bank thus measures the concentration of the 
markets in which it operates, using as weights the distribution of its branch networks in the regions.  
                                                 
5 Available at http://www.raexpert.ru/ratings/regions/.  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/ 2010 
 
 
  11 
This variable is useful for checking whether a positive link exists between concentration and market 
power. The existence of such a link would be a strong argument, based on a need for greater compe-
tition, against the consolidation of the Russian banking industry. While also using the Herfindahl 
index to measure concentration, FMP (2005) and FM (2007) interestingly find no significant coeffi-
cient for this variable. 
We use the logarithm of total assets (Log(Assets)) to measure size. We also include the 
squared term (Log(Assets)²) in the estimations to consider possible nonlinearity in the relationship 
between size and market power. There are several reasons for including this variable. First, as there 
have been many bank failures in Russia in recent years, being “too big to fail” can play a role by 
affording an advantage to large banks in attracting depositors, which could lead to wider margins. 
Second, economies of scale may exist, allowing the largest banks to benefit from lower costs. Third, 
existence of a relationship between size and market power would also contribute to the debate on 
consolidation in the Russian banking industry. A positive link would argue against a pro-merger 
policy for competitive reasons. 
Loans  to  Industrial  Production  is  calculated  as  a  weighted  average  of  the  loans-to-
industrial-production ratios of regions in which a given bank has operations. Similar to the case of 
concentration, we use weights based on the distribution of branch offices in regions. The loans-to-
industrial-production ratio is used to proxy the elasticity of demand, following FM (2007) who use 
the ratio of loans to GDP at regional level for a similar purpose. The theory stresses that greater 
elasticity of demand through a lower value of this ratio, i.e. lower dependence on bank financing, 
results in less market power for banks. A positive relationship is thus expected between this ratio 
and market power.  
Further, we account for the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans to measure risk 
(Nonperforming Loans). This ratio is a standard measure of risk in the banking literature (e.g. Ber-
ger and DeYoung, 1997). It is used in the estimations since a higher nonperforming loans ratio is 
expected to reduce market power because of the losses involved. Furthermore, greater risk could 
divert depositors from the bank and hence increase the bank’s costs of attracting clients. Both FMP 
(2005) and FM (2007) use the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. They stress that the non-
performing loans ratio would be a better measure of risk, but it cannot be used, for data availability 
reasons.  
Next to the four key determinants, we add some variables of particular interest for Russian 
banks. We add dummy variables for foreign ownership (Foreign Ownership) and state ownership Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill 
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(State Ownership), in accordance with the potential role of ownership. We show that there are dif-
ferences in market power between different ownership categories, which evolve over time; hence 
the link between these ownership forms and market power is ambiguous over the period. Further-
more, we include a variable for investor risk, which includes legal, economic, financial, social, 
criminal, ecological and administrative components (Investor Risk). Indeed a major concern in Rus-
sia is the weak institutional environment, which results in a notably high level of corruption by in-
ternational standards (Weill, 2008). Studies have however shown the existence of strong differences 
in institutional environment among Russian regions, so the potential impact of investor risk should 
be considered. Finally, we control for the business cycle by including regional growth of industrial 
production (Industrial Growth). 
Dummy variables for each quarter and each year are also included in the estimations, to 
control for seasonal and yearly effects.  
Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Table 2. 
 
 
5  Results 
 
This section provides the analysis of market power of Russian banks. We begin by providing in-
formation on the level and evolution of the Lerner index for Russian banks. We then investigate 
whether these indices differ by bank ownership. Next we analyze the determinants of market power 
of Russian banks. 
 
5.1   Market power of Russian banks 
 
We present the estimates of market power for Russian banks for each year in Table 3. We observe 
that the average Lerner index for the period is 21.4%. Therefore, market power of banks in Russia is 
very similar to that observed in developed countries. For instance, Fernandez de Guevara and Mau-
dos (2007) find yearly mean Lerner indices between 16.9% and 24.9% for Spanish banks, while 
Carbo-Valverde and al. (2009) observe mean Lerner indices at the country level ranging from 11% 
to 22% for EU countries, with an EU mean of 16%
6. 
In dynamic terms, the evolution of the Lerner index shows a relatively stable level of bank 
competition over the period with yearly means ranging from 20.1% to 21.4% and a reduction of the 
                                                 
6 It is necessary to point out that the data we use are based on RAS, which differ from IFRS data.  
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variability of Lerner indices over time. We nonetheless observe a slight decrease over the period, 
from 21.4% in 2001 to 20.4% in 2007, which is statistically significant. 
The analysis of the mean Lerner index for the Russian banking industry is of utmost inter-
est to investigate average bank behavior. However, the appraisal of the macroeconomic effects of 
changes in bank competition notably through changes in loan rates needs to consider differently 
banks according to their market share. As mentioned above, there are huge differences in size 
among Russian banks and, notably, a market share of about 30% for the largest bank (Sberbank). 
Therefore, we also measure the mean Lerner index weighted by market shares of banks in total 
banking sector assets. These figures are also presented in Table 3. 
We point out two striking findings. On the one hand, the trend for the mean weighted 
Lerner index is similar to the one observed with the standard mean Lerner index. We still observe a 
slight reduction of the market power, supporting the view of moderately enhanced bank competi-
tion. On the other hand, the mean weighted Lerner index has lower values than the standard Lerner 
index, which supports the view of a level of bank competition in Russia similar to that in other 
countries.  
As a consequence, our main finding is that, in spite of the major changes in Russia in re-
cent  years,  including  strong  economic  growth  and  banking  reforms  (e.g.  the  deposit  insurance 
scheme), bank competition has only slightly improved in recent years. One can notably wonder why 
the changes in the banking industry, such as the increasing market share for foreign banks, have not 
enhanced bank competition. To this end, it is interesting to investigate market power by ownership 
type. 
 
5.2   Market power by ownership type 
 
As mentioned above, the Russian banking industry is characterized by a persistently large market 
share for state-controlled banks and a relatively small market share of foreign-owned banks, in 
comparison with the other transition countries. Thus, it is interesting to investigate how these char-
acteristics influence banks’ behavior in Russia. 
We investigate whether foreign-owned, state-controlled and domestic private banks differ 
in market power and thus aim to uncover whether the ownership structure of the Russian banking 
industry affects bank competition. Table 4 presents the mean Lerner indices for each category of 
banks and for each year. Several conclusions emerge. Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill 
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First, the ranking of categories in terms of market power has been changing over the pe-
riod. In 2001, market power of domestic private banks was on average significantly higher than for 
foreign-owned banks but significantly lower than for state-controlled banks. In 2002, market power 
of state-controlled banks was not significantly different from that of domestic private and foreign-
owned banks. Then, from 2003 to 2007, state-controlled banks have significantly less market power 
than foreign-owned and domestic private banks, while both of these latter categories do not have 
significantly different market power. Thus, the conclusions drawn at first glance, considering only 
mean market power levels over the period, are misleading. Indeed this quick look shows a decreas-
ing degree of market power for all categories of banks, even though this pattern has not been con-
stant over time. 
Second, market power of state-controlled banks was decreased considerably over the pe-
riod, with a significant drop from 24% in 2001 to 15.5% in 2007. This reduction in market power 
can be explained by the weakening of their competitive advantage in terms of safety. Indeed state-
controlled banks used to have an advantage in collecting deposits, as their ownership status has pre-
vented them from going bankrupt. This advantage was particularly important in Russia, where more 
than 2000 banks have been liquidated or have vanished since the beginning of transition. As a con-
sequence, demand may have been less elastic for state-controlled banks than for other banks, as cli-
ents were willing to pay more to have safe deposits. Nevertheless, this competitive advantage has 
been reduced over time, for two reasons. On the one hand, macroeconomic stability has considera-
bly reduced financial instability, as indicated by the reduction in the average ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total loans for Russian banks. On the other hand, a deposit insurance scheme was imple-
mented in 2004, leading to the same protection for small depositors in state-controlled and in the 
other banks as well. 
Third, market power has significantly improved for foreign-owned banks, from 15% in 
2001 to 20.1% in 2007. Several factors may explain this evolution. On the one hand, banking mar-
kets are characterized by switching costs, which prevent new competitors to be as competitive as 
incumbents in attracting customers (Kim, Kliger and Vale, 2001). Therefore, following their entry, 
foreign-owned banks had incentives to charge lower prices than other banks. However, after attract-
ing customers, foreign-owned banks may have been gradually raising their prices, to become stan-
dard banks, which is confirmed by the fact that their market power is not significantly different 
from the other (domestic) private banks. On the other hand, the increase in market power of foreign-
owned banks may also derive from the fact that, with the increasing revenue of Russian firms and  
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households, some of these banks have gradually evolved towards an upmarket niche, allowing them 
to charge higher prices. 
Fourth, market power of domestic private banks has decreased slightly but significantly 
over the period, from 21.5% in 2001 to 20.6% in 2007. This moderate evolution may be the result 
of the competitive pressures resulting from foreign-owned banks. Indeed, at the beginning of the 
period, foreign-owned banks had lower market power than domestic private banks, which may give 
the latter an incentive to reduce their margins. In their analysis of the effects of foreign bank entry 
on  a  sample  of  developed  and  developing  countries,  Claessens,  Demirgüc-Kunt  and  Huizinga 
(2001) support this view by concluding that increased presence of foreign banks is associated with a 
reduction in domestic banks’ margins. Available empirical evidence for Russia (Fungáčová and 
Poghosyan, 2009) shows that in the 2000s the margins of domestic banks in Russia, both state-
controlled and private ones, have indeed been decreasing towards the level of margins in foreign-
owned banks. 
Thus, our major finding is for the existence of significant differences in market power of 
banks depending on ownership. These differences are of utmost interest for understanding the main 
pattern of the evolution of bank competition over the period, but they also inform policy recom-
mendations concerning competition. 
Indeed we observe that our finding of decreasing market power over time for Russian 
banks – which was observed for all Russian banks, whether considered as equal or weighted by 
market share (i.e. enabling a strong influence of state-controlled banks) - is driven by the behavior 
of state-controlled and domestic private banks, and not at all by the behavior of foreign-owned 
banks. We cannot conclude that foreign bank entry per se promotes competition. However, the 
competitive pressures exerted by foreign-owned banks may have contributed to the reduction in the 
market power of domestic banks. Thus, our findings do not contradict the commonly accepted view 
in the literature that foreign bank presence is associated with greater competition in the banking 
market (e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Furthermore, the considerable reduction of market power 
for state-controlled banks over time, resulting in less market power among all categories of banks, 
does not argue for their privatization for competitive reasons. 
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5.3   Determinants of market power of Russian banks 
 
We now investigate the determinants of market power for Russian banks. In line with former stud-
ies, we perform random-effects regressions of Lerner indices on a set of variables. The results are 
displayed in Table 5. Four different estimations are done, to check the sensitivity of the results. The 
first estimation includes all tested determinants as defined above (column 1). This is the benchmark 
specification. The second estimation excludes the regional variables (Herfindahl Index, Loans to 
Industrial Production, Investor Risk, Industrial Growth) (column 2). The third replaces two deter-
minants by alternative variables (column 3). Namely, we use the market share of the three largest 
banks (Market Share of big 3) instead of the Herfindahl index to measure concentration, and the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (Loan Loss Provisions) instead of nonperforming loans 
ratio to measure risk. This specification helps us check whether our results are sensitive to the 
choice of variables to proxy the determinants. The fourth estimation (column 4) uses lagged values 
in all determinants. This estimation is helpful, as the tested determinants may influence market 
power with a lag. We use a lag of 3 months to minimize the reduction in the number of observa-
tions. 
Herfindahl  Index  has  a  significantly positive impact  on market  power  as  measured by 
Lerner index. When this variable is replaced by Market Share of big 3, the result is similar. This is 
in line with the intuitive hypothesis that a more concentrated banking industry contributes to in-
creasing market  power  of banks.  Nonetheless  it differs from  the non-significant  link found for 
Western European countries (FMP, 2005; FM, 2007). Moreover, it indicates that consolidation of 
the Russian banking industry, motivated by scale economies or financial stability, might hamper 
bank competition. 
The coefficient for Log(Assets) is significant and positive, which suggests a positive im-
pact of size on market power. However, the significantly negative coefficient of Log(Assets)² shows 
that this relationship is nonlinear. This suggests that increasing size enhances market power up to a 
certain point beyond which greater size becomes detrimental for market power. In other words, 
small-sized banks and larger banks should have less market power than medium-sized banks. This 
finding has several implications. First, the “too big to fail” argument, which could carry a competi-
tive advantage in Russia where bank failures have been common during the last decade, is not suffi-
cient to explain banks’ market power, however large they are. Second, it suggests that economies of 
scale may not be strong enough to motivate increased size. Nevertheless further research would be 
needed to estimate the economies of scale in the Russian banking industry. Third, larger banks re- 
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sulting from mergers may not necessarily hamper competition. Comparing our results for Russian 
banks to former studies, we notice that they are in line with the findings of FMP (2005) on Euro-
pean banks, who also find a positive coefficient for size but negative for squared size. On the other 
hand, our findings differ from the results in the FM (2007) study for Spanish banks. 
The estimated coefficient for Loans to Industrial Production, which is an inverse measure 
of the elasticity of demand, is significantly positive. This finding accords with our expectations, as a 
lower ratio means greater elasticity of demand via less dependence on bank financing, and conse-
quently less market power. This validation of the theoretical expectation differs from the findings in 
former studies, as FM (2007) find a non-significant coefficient and FMP (2005) find a coefficient 
which is significantly either positive or negative. 
Nonperforming Loans, which measures risk, has a significantly negative estimated coeffi-
cient. Replacing this variable by Loan Loss Provisions, we obtain the same result. This finding can 
be explained by the reduction of margins caused by loan losses, but also in the Russian context, by 
the diversion of depositors from banks with greater loan losses. The literature provides evidence of 
depositor’s discipline from Russia (see e.g. Karas, Pyle and Schoors, 2010). It is of interest to ob-
serve that the measure used for risk in FMP (2005) and FM (2007), the ratio of loan loss provisions 
to total loans, is not significant. So here again the theoretical expectations seem to be valid for Rus-
sia rather than for developed countries. 
Ownership dummies are not significant. This accords with the observation in the above 
subsection that neither foreign-owned nor state-controlled banks consistently outperform or under-
perform domestic private banks in market power over the period of analysis. 
Finally, both variables controlling for the macroeconomic and the institutional environ-
ment are significant. The coefficient is positive for Industrial Growth, which is an interesting find-
ing because it shows that economic expansion is not necessarily associated with greater banking 
competition, as we have seen for the Russian banking market as a whole. The significance of Inves-
tor Risk variable supports the view that institutional environment influences the behavior of Russian 
banks. The positive sign of the coefficient may be explained by the fact that greater investor risk 
prevents new competitors from entering the market. 
Thus, the analysis of the determinants of market power for Russian banks has helped us 
identify the  factors which influence bank competition. The fact  that our main  results  have not 
changed in alternative specifications supports their robustness. In a nutshell, we observe that pro-
competitive policies in Russia do not include the prohibition of mergers, the relaxed entry of foreign Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill 
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banks or the privatization. Indeed neither large size nor domestic or state ownership are associated 
with greater market power.  
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses bank competition in Russia during the period 2001-2007. Our findings can be 
summarized as follows. First, bank competition only slightly improved between 2001 and 2007. 
Nevertheless, the level of bank competition is very similar to that observed in the developed coun-
tries. Russian banking industry does not seem to suffer from excessive market power of banks. Sec-
ond,  no  category  of  banks  among  domestic  private  banks,  state-controlled  banks,  and  foreign-
owned banks, has been persistently more or less competitive than the others. We observe enhanced 
market power for foreign-owned banks and reduced market power for state-controlled banks over 
the period, leading to the finding that the most competitive banks were foreign-owned banks at the 
beginning of the period, and state-owned banks at the end of the period. Third, our investigation of 
the determinants of market power identifies the roles of concentration and risk, the absence of im-
pact of ownership, and the nonlinear influence of size, among others things. 
In a nutshell, our findings qualify the need for procompetitive policy in the Russian bank-
ing industry. Indeed, Russia does not suffer from particularly weak bank competition. Furthermore, 
the standard policies for promoting competition do not find support here. Namely, the relaxed entry 
of foreign banks and the privatization of state-owned banks would not likely lead to greater compe-
tition. Moreover, the prohibition of mergers to limit bank size may also not favour competition, as 
the relationship between size and market power is an inverse U-curve. 
This conclusion should be related to the finding from Fungáčová and Weill (2009) that 
greater bank competition enhances the occurrence of bank failures. Indeed, when considering to-
gether this possible danger of enhancing bank competition in a country plagued by financial insta-
bility and our findings on the fairly normal level of bank competition in Russia and the difficulties 
of designing a procompetitive policy, one can reasonably wonder whether bank competition should 
be promoted in this country. Nevertheless, this study is only the first one to investigate bank compe-
tition in Russia, and further analysis is needed to confirm our conclusions. 
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Table 1 
Main indicators of banking system development in Russia, 2000-2008  
 
 
  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008 
Domestic credit to private sector/ GDP  12  17  23  30  40 
Bank assets / GDP  32  38  43  52  67 
Number of registered banks  1 311  1 329  1 299  1 189  1 108 
Asset share of foreign-owned banks  9.5  8  8  12  19 
  Source: CBR, EBRD for asset share of foreign-owned banks 








  Mean  Median  St. deviation 
Lerner index  0.214  0.209  0.115 
Logarithm of assets  6.355  6.320  1.808 
Nonperforming loans  0.019  0.005  0.045 
Herfindahl index  0.155  0.122  0.159 
Loans to industrial production   4.907  2.270  6.093 
Industrial growth  0.232  0.215  0.144 
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Table 3 
Yearly Lerner indexes 
 
 
Year  No. of obs.  Mean  Median  St. deviation  Mean weighted 
by size 
2001  3985  0.215  0.212  0.124  0.148 
2002  3941  0.218  0.212  0.120  0.156 
2003  4279  0.220  0.217  0.119  0.145 
2004  4294  0.217  0.211  0.114  0.136 
2005  4156  0.211  0.205  0.105  0.150 
2006  2716  0.201  0.197  0.102  0.110 
2007  855  0.204  0.201  0.103  0.103 





Lerner indices by ownership 
 
 
  STATE-CONTROLLED  FOREIGN MAJORITY  PRIVATE 
Year  Obs.  Mean  Median  St.dev.  Obs.  Mean  Median  St.dev.  Obs.  Mean  Median  St.dev. 
2001  109  0.240  0.242  0.132  99  0.149  0.173  0.162  3777  0.216  0.212  0.122 
2002  107  0.209  0.202  0.111  104  0.195  0.192  0.134  3730  0.219  0.212  0.120 
2003  117  0.201  0.200  0.107  110  0.237  0.225  0.148  4052  0.220  0.218  0.118 
2004  122  0.176  0.172  0.110  112  0.211  0.220  0.158  4060  0.218  0.212  0.112 
2005  123  0.178  0.171  0.098  127  0.222  0.213  0.133  3906  0.212  0.206  0.104 
2006  101  0.160  0.158  0.107  109  0.218  0.204  0.127  2506  0.202  0.198  0.100 
2007  28  0.155  0.161  0.090  38  0.201  0.203  0.115  789  0.206  0.202  0.103 
Total  707  0.192  0.188  0.113  699  0.206  0.206  0.144  22820  0.215  0.210  0.114 
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Table 5 
Determinants of market power 
 
Random effect estimations where the dependent variable is Lerner index. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses below estimated coefficients. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 
0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Seasonal and yearly dummy variables and constant included but not 
reported. 
 








Log (Assets)  0.022***  0.020***  0.023***  0.012*** 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Log (Assets) ²   -0.002***   -0.002***   -0.002***   -0.002*** 
(0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Nonperforming loans   -0.135***   -0.131***     -0.202*** 
(0.017)  (0.017)    (0.021) 
Loan loss provisions       -0.037***   
    (0.012)   
State ownership  -0.003  1.E-05  -0.002  1.E-05 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Foreign ownership  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  0.009 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Herfindahl index  0.029***      0.024*** 
(0.009)      (0.010) 
Market share of big 3 
    0.021***   
    (0.006)   
Loans to industrial pro-
duction 
0.001***    0.001***  0.001*** 
(0.0002)    (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Industrial growth  0.011*    0.011*  0.003 
(0.006)    (0.006)  (0.006) 
Investor risk  0.0003***      0.0002*** 
(0.0001)      (0.0001) 
R
2  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.06 
N  24226  24226  24226  21584 
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